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The expected increase in aid to Africa will put a big challenge for public service 
delivery. Using a simultaneous equation model, this paper provides an analysis of the 
effects of the volume and volatility of aid on education, health, water and sanitation 
outcomes, taking also into account the institutions related to public service delivery, 
including freedom of press, corruption and decentralization. Overall, the share of 
official development assistance (ODA) that is provided for education and health seems 
to have a positive impact on the outcomes in these sectors, whereas total aid seems to be 
negatively associated. Aid volatility is associated with better outcomes in sanitation, 
water and infant mortality, contrary to expectations. 
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Sub-Saharan Africa in general is not on track for meeting the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) by 2015. Thus a doubling of aid in general and specifically to Africa was 
agreed at the G-8 summit in 2005 in order to substantially improve the delivery of 
government services and investments in infrastructure. Increased aid and debt relief are 
expected to boost government spending to improve health, education and infrastructure, 
which are perceived as the classical tasks of the state.  
Of the eight MDGs two are related to education, three to health and one to water and 
sanitation, one important part of infrastructure.1 On current trends most regions will fall 
short on the goals for reducing child and maternity mortality, and the number of people 
infected with HIV/AIDS continues to grow. The goals of universal primary education 
and of gender equality in primary and secondary education will not be met in three of 
the six developing regions. In Africa the situation is even bleaker. Although primary 
school enrolment has increased rapidly, this has not sufficiently translated into higher 
completion rates. Likewise the reduction of child mortality and the increase in access to 
water and sanitation have been slow (UNECA 2005). 
Thus, to reach these MDGs, improved service delivery in education and health as well 
as investment in water and sanitation is needed. It is estimated that to reach the health 
related MDGs, Sub-Saharan Africa needs to triple its health workforce, adding more 
than one million workers. To reach universal primary education the current stock of 
teachers has to increase by almost 20 per cent each year. On average, budget allocations 
do not reach the benchmark of 20 per cent of government budget earmarked for 
education and 15 per cent for health, also indicating a need for an increase in public 
expenditure (WB/IMF 2005; UNECA 2005).2 However, to reach the MDGs it is not 
sufficient to increase spending for public service delivery but its efficiency also needs to 
be improved. The question is thus how to boost service delivery and maintain a larger 
stock of related investment in a sustainable way, so that it can be ultimately financed 
from domestic resources. 
The expected increase in aid will be a big challenge for service delivery. As the 
efficiency of resource spending depends not only on the capacities and characteristics of 
the recipient country but also on the quality of aid in terms of predictability, consistency 
with recipients priorities and donor coordination, the main focus of this paper is on the 
effects of the volume and volatility of aid. In addition, the institutions related to public 
service delivery are taken into account.  
After a short overview of aid flows to Africa and the current state of service delivery in 
the region, the potential effects of public expenditure and aid on the quantity and quality 
                                                 
1   Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education;  
Goal 3/Target 4: Eliminate gender inequality in primary and secondary education;  
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality;  
Goal 5: Improve maternal health;  
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases;  
Goal 7/Target 2: Halve the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and 
basic sanitation. 
2   These targets were agreed under the Education for All Fast Track Initiative and the Abuja Declaration, 
signed in 2002. 2 
of service delivery in education, health and water and sanitation are discussed. As the 
problems with service delivery and the share of aid in public expenditure are higher in 
Africa than in other regions, the following discussion focuses on Africa but is also 
relevant for other low-income countries. A simultaneous equation model for estimating 
the determinants of service delivery is presented and the results are discussed before 
concluding.  
2  Recent developments in aid and public service delivery 
After a decline in the 1990s, official development assistance (ODA) to Africa has been 
increasing again since 2002.3 This trend is expected to continue after the promises made 
by the G-8 in Gleneagles in 2005. With respect to the sectoral distribution the largest 
percentage of ODA to Africa in 2001-02 went to social infrastructure and services (36 
per cent), including education and health. Another important sector is economic 
infrastructure and services (14 per cent) that include water, transport and energy. 
Together with support for production (9 per cent) this is expected not only to reduce the 
financing gap but also contribute to future growth perspectives (OECD 2005). 
Increasingly, ODA is given in the form of budget support instead of project and 
programme aid, making its use more flexible for recipients and reducing the problems 
of tied aid.4 
In many African countries a large share of public investment in infrastructure and social 
expenditure (especially for education and health) is financed by aid, making these 
crucial sectors vulnerable to aid volatility (World Bank/IMF 2005). Aid volatility is 
 
Table 1 
Summary statistics on public service delivery outcomes and ODA per sector, 2002 
 Africa  Other  developing
    
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)   86.66  32.35 
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000)   136.29  41.34 
Literacy rate, youth total (% of people aged 15-24)   77.38  93.36 
Primary completion rate, total (% of relevant age group)   61.02  91.60 
Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access)   40.90  69.95 
Improved water source (% of population with access)   66.26  83.83 
ODA commitments for education (% of total ODA)  9.56  8.09 
ODA commitments for health (% of total ODA)  5.24  4.46 
ODA commitments for water and sanitation (% of total ODA)  2.91  5.11 
Note:   Averages are weighted. 
Source:   World Bank (2005) and OECD (2006). 
                                                 
3  ODA consists of disbursements of loans made on concessional terms (net of repayments of principal) 
and grants by official agencies of the members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), by 
multilateral institutions and by non-DAC countries to promote economic development and welfare in 
recipient countries. They include matching grants for debt relief (World Bank 2005). 
4   Tied aid means that at least part of the amount received has to be spent by purchasing goods and 
services from the donor country. This reduces the efficiency of aid. 3 
higher and has more negative effects for countries that depend heavily on aid (Bulíř and 
Hamann 2003). With US$26 of net ODA per capita in 2002, Africa receives more than 
double the amount per inhabitant than the average of all ODA recipients (OECD 2005). 
But whereas in African countries a higher share of ODA is on average directed towards 
education and health, the outcomes in these sectors are worse than in other regions. By 
contrast, for water and sanitation African countries receive a lower share of ODA, 
which is in line with the less favourable outcomes (Table 1). 
3  Public expenditure, aid and the quality of service delivery 
Aid, in principle, makes more money available for public spending on health, education 
and water and sanitation, which in turn should improve service delivery. But it might 
also create significant challenges for recipient countries with respect to the management 
of resources and dependency on volatile flows. Many studies find diminishing returns of 
aid on growth, which might also apply to service delivery. In the following, first the 
general effects of increasing public expenditure are discussed followed by a discussion 
of the effects of aid. 
In general, the empirical evidence that more public expenditure might lead to better 
quality public services is weak. A number of studies show that the effect of public 
spending for education and educational attainment is low and that it is rather influenced 
by other variables such as per capita income, the age distribution of the population or 
parental education. The picture is more mixed for the effect of public spending on 
health on health outcomes, with some studies finding that the effect is not significant 
while others find a positive contribution (Gupta, Verhoeven and Tiongson 1999; World 
Bank/IMF 2005). In the provision of water and sewerage services higher spending 
might also not lead to a proportional increase in the quality of service delivery as 
leakages are quite high (Briceno-Garmendia, Estache and Shafik 2004). 
The efficiency of service delivery is greatly influenced by the use of funds for different 
types of expenditure like wages, construction or physical inputs. The allocation of 
resources in turn depends on the quality of governance. In the case of education, the 
weak link between expenditure and results can be explained by the fact that the cost 
effectiveness of different measures varies widely. Whereas the provision of textbooks is 
relatively cheap and effective, a reduction of student teacher ratios is relatively 
expensive and of limited effect below a threshold of 60 students per class. In addition, 
the distribution of resources plays a big role. If every second child in each class has a 
textbook, student achievements are almost as high as with individual books. Hence, an 
equal distribution of books across schools and classes will result in much higher 
achievements than a skewed distribution of all books to a limited number of privileged 
schools (Michaelowa and Wechtler 2006). Likewise, in the provision of health services, 
the expansion of hospitals does have less impact on child mortality rates than allocation 
on immunization programmes and malaria control.  
In addition, the number of people involved in decisionmaking and service delivery and 
the dependency on the discretionary behaviour of individuals provide opportunities for 
the leakage of funds. Furthermore the difficult working conditions and uncompetitive 
salaries can reduce the accountability of service provision, fostering absenteeism and 
low quality (World Bank/IMF 2005). 4 
Therefore, an increase in public expenditure is likely to increase outcomes only if 
institutions are in place to ensure the efficient use of resources. Large variations in the 
record of governments in delivering public services and reducing poverty often can be 
attributed to differences in the incentives for politicians to allocate public resources. 
Such misallocations can be traced to constraints on the extent to which poor people can 
hold governments accountable, such as lack of information about service quality, lack of 
credibility of political promises, and polarization of voters on social and ideological 
grounds. Greater political accountability improves public services and reduces 
corruption. For example, transparency in Uganda with respect to government transfers 
to local spending units has reduced leakage of those funds by as much as 90 per cent 
(World Bank 2003). 
One recent trend aimed at increasing participation and transparency in public service 
delivery is decentralization. While decentralization may lead to greater accountability 
and hence to increased prospects that services would reach targeted groups, the 
possibility of the local elite capturing the services suggests that decentralization is not a 
panacea. There is evidence that decentralization might only reduce poverty through 
better targeting of service delivery in countries with sufficient capacity and willingness 
of policymakers to ensure a pro-poor development process. Thus strengthening the 
institutional capability at the local level is essential if decentralization is to be effective. 
In addition, improving service delivery requires strengthening the relationships of 
accountability among policymakers, service providers, and users (Jütting et al. 2004; 
World Bank 2003). 
It has to be noted that in most developing countries a large share of expenditure for 
health, education and water and sanitation comes from private sources, mainly out of 
pocket payments. In many African countries, private expenditure for health is higher 
than public expenditure, for example in Morocco it is 3.4 per cent of GDP versus 1.7 
per cent of GDP for public health expenditure. Even in very poor countries like Burkina 
Faso private health expenditure is higher (3.0 per cent of GDP) than public spending 
(2.6 per cent of GDP). In addition, there are private providers of services and 
infrastructure including NGOs. Direct payments for water are especially high for the 
poor. In Uganda water payments account for 22 per cent of the average income of urban 
households in the poorest 20 per cent of the income distribution (UNDP 2006). 
Especially in low-income countries a large part of public expenditure for education, 
health and water and sanitation is financed through aid. For example aid commitments 
amounted to 42 per cent of public expenditure for health in 2003, although not all of this 
aid is channelled through government budgets (High-Level Forum on the Health MDGs 
2005). In general, aid does increase public expenditure but the relationship is less than 
one to one. One explanation is that aid is partly used for tax relief but there is also 
evidence that governments do not receive all aid flows reported by donors, as some aid 
is spent, for example, on consultants from donor countries (Mackinnon 2003). Countries 
becoming heavily dependent on aid can create significant problems. Lewis (2005) finds 
in the case of HIV/AIDS programmes that aid dependency can lead to reduced 
incentives to mobilize domestic resources, shift of priorities towards donor interests, 
less concern about inefficiency in service delivery, and a potential for increased 
corruption and rent seeking. In addition, aid might disturb the coherence of 
recipient-government decisions because of differing interests between donors and 
recipients and information asymmetries (Mackinnon 2003). Thus efforts to improve 5 
governance through fighting corruption, for example, might increase aid effectiveness 
considerably. 
One fundamental problem of increased public expenditure through aid as a big push is 
the absorptive capacity of the recipient country. The ministries charged with managing 
the delivery of services could face significant organizational challenges, when they need 
to administer much higher budgets. The increased public expenditure through aid 
inflows might also drive up the costs of public service delivery and construction and can 
increase the shortage of qualified personnel in the private sector (Mackinnon 2003). In 
addition, aid is strongly pro-cyclical, so it cannot be used to compensate for reduced 
government revenue (Mackinnon 2003). 
The composition of expenditure financed by aid might change with the scale of the task. 
For example, two-thirds of aid for education is currently provided in the form of 
technical assistance, even though the bulk of expenditure is on local personnel. There is 
evidence that the number of workers in health and education services is correlated with 
coverage. In addition, wages especially for skilled professionals have to increase to 
reduce migration and braindrain. Hence, if increased aid does not also cover personnel 
and operational costs, it is likely that the quality of service delivery will decline (World 
Bank/IMF 2005). 
Both higher aid and the associated higher volatility are likely to pose a significant 
burden on the planning capacities of countries. The recent literature on the effects of aid 
volatility and predictability has focused on its negative relation with growth. Aid 
volatility is likely to affect the determinants of growth, such as investment, government 
revenue and expenditure. The instability of aid disbursements may alter fiscal 
behaviour, possibly causing a decrease in public investment (Lensink and Morrissey 
2000). There is also empirical evidence that a permanent flow of aid finances mainly 
consumption, whereas shocks to aid result in fluctuations of investment (Arellano et al. 
2005). Furthermore, the volatility of programme aid is higher than that of project 
assistance. As the latter is designed to promote investment in physical and human 
capital, its volatility is likely to have more severe negative effects on long-term 
development (Fielding and Mavrotas 2005).5 Other evidence shows that volatility of aid 
targeted to productive public spending reduces the positive growth effect, whereas 
volatility of aid for non-productive use is growth enhancing (Neanidis and Varvarigos 
2005). Although to my knowledge there are no studies that analyse the link between aid 
volatility and service delivery, it is likely that service delivery is one of the channels 
through which aid volatility affects growth. Specifically, a negative correlation between 
aid volatility and volatility in public expenditure for health has been noted (High-Level 
Forum on the Health MDGs 2005). 
One strategy to cope with uncertainty of future aid flows is to make expenditure more 
flexible. Ministries must decide whether to employ more civil servants or whether to 
outsource service delivery. This decision has to take into account the efficiency of 
service delivery but also the minimization of risks from aid volatility (Heller 2005). For 
example in primary education a trend towards contract teachers, who are no longer civil 
servants but are employed on the basis of fixed-term contracts, is observable. These 
contracts are employed both by the government at different levels and by parent groups, 
                                                 
5 Aid volatility is measured by shocks to aid in the paper by Fielding and Mavrotas (2005). 6 
mainly in cases where no public schools exist. In a sample of eleven francophone 
African countries, Michaelowa and Wechtler (2006) find that privately employed 
contract primary teachers account on average for 29 per cent of all teachers, whereas 
publicly employed contract teachers account for 20 per cent and civil servants only for 
51 per cent. As publicly employed contract teachers earn less than half of their civil 
servant peers, this trend has facilitated the boost of primary enrolment at relatively low 
costs. Although the contract teachers have a lower level of professional training and less 
favourable working conditions, no negative effect on student performance has been 
noted, probably due to a different incentive structure as further employment prospects 
depend on performance and parent satisfaction (Michaelowa and Wechtler 2006). 
These findings from existing literature support the hypothesis that the effectiveness of 
aid with respect to public service delivery might depend on institutional factors and that 
aid volatility might reduce the returns to aid. An increase in public expenditure, be it 
through aid or other revenue, will increase the scope and quality of service delivery 
mainly when institutions are in place that set the right incentives for efficient resource 
allocation. 
4  Data and methodology 
In this paper we look at the determinants of outcomes in the areas of water and 
sanitation, health and education simultaneously, as it is assumed that outcomes in one 
area will also affect outcomes in other areas. For example improved access to sanitation 
will reduce the spread of infectious diseases. In fact, expanding water and sanitation 
services is perceived as one of the most cost-effective strategies for improving health 
outcomes. Inadequate access to clean water means that girls have to spend a lot of their 
time collecting water thus limiting their time to go to school.6 In addition, education—
especially of women—has a positive effect on the health of their children and measures 
that are meant to improve education, such as school feeding and deworming, will have 
an impact on malnutrition and thus health. There is less evidence that outcomes in 
health or education will directly affect the provision of water and sanitation (World 
Bank/IMF 2005; WHO and UNICEF 2006; UNDP 2006).  
The public service delivery production functions are structured as follows: 
Hi = f (Ei,  Ii, SHi, Xi)  (1) 
Ei = f (Hi, Ii, SEi, Yi)   (2) 
Ii = f (SIi, Zi)   (3) 
where Hi is a health outcome for a country i, which is a function of education and water 
and sanitation outcomes Ei and Ii, and of a set of variables that capture public spending 
and aid for health SHi, as well as a number of socio-economic variables, summarized in 
                                                 
6  However, this finding is mainly based on household studies in a limited number of countries. In 
addition the effects of water on health vary by type of provision of water and sanitation, which is not 
captured in the country data available (UNDP 2006). 7 
vector Xi. Likewise education outcome is a function of health and water and sanitation 
outcomes as well as of public spending and aid to these areas SEi and several socio-
economic variables Yi. Finally, water and sanitation outcome is a function of aid SIi and 
several socio-economic variables Zi. These socio-economic variables can differ between 
the three equations and will be elaborated below. 
The functional form of the three equations is assumed to be similar to the health and 




PubExp Aid Aid to sector
Outcome eA  * *
NG N I A i d
α βγ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤
= ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥
⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 (4) 
With Outcome being the outcome in water and sanitation, health or education, PubExp 
the public expenditure in the respective sector, N the population size or number of 
students in the case of education, Aid is total ODA and Aid to sector the amount of 




PubExp Aid Aid to sector
ln (Outcome ) A ln ln ln
N GNI Aid
αβ γ
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤
=+ + + ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥
⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 (5) 
To be able to estimate this system of equations the reduced form of Equation (1) has to 
be derived through replacement of Ei with Equation (2). Thus health outcomes are a 
function of water and sanitation outcomes, determinants of health outcomes and 
determinants of education outcomes. For the estimation of the system, first Equation (3) 
was used as water and sanitation outcomes are assumed to be independent of health and 
education outcomes. For the estimation of health outcomes, fitted values of water and 
sanitation are used and for the estimation of education outcomes fitted values of health 
are used in addition.7 
Through an intensification of research on the MDGs, also the availability of data that 
better measure the outcomes of public service delivery for a relatively large number of 
countries has increased. For example, for education one no longer has to rely on 
enrolment rates, which tell little about the quality of education. The new indicator of the 
completion of primary education gives a much better picture of the outcome of primary 
schooling.8 In addition youth literacy is used as an indicator of education outcomes. To 
measure health outcomes, the two widely used and available indicators of infant (aged 0 
to 1 year) mortality rates and child (aged 0 to 5 years) mortality rates are used. The two 
indicators used for water and sanitation are access to improved water source and access 
                                                 
7  For these regressions only ordinary least squares were used. Gupta, Verhoeven and Tiongson (1999), 
who use a similar specification of the functions but without a system of equations, find very similar 
results using OLS and 2SLS regressions, indicating that reverse causality might not be a major 
problem here. 
8   Primary completion rate is defined as the number of students successfully completing the last year of 
(or graduating from) primary school in a given year, divided by the number of children of official 
graduation age in the population (World Bank 2005). 8 
to improved sanitation facilities as per cent of the population, as these are closely 
related to poverty reduction and part of the MDGs.9 
To capture public expenditure in the different sectors, expenditure per student in 
primary education and health expenditure per capita are used.10 Unfortunately no public 
expenditure data for water and sanitation were available. Likewise data for private 
expenditure on all three sectors were not available for a sufficient number of countries, 
so they could not be included here.  
To capture the effect of aid, both the shares of ODA going to health, education and 
water and sanitation in total ODA as well as the share of total aid in GNI were used, as 
aid might be fungible. In addition, the share of budget aid in total aid has increased over 
the past decade and might also be used for public services. Aid data for 2000 are used, 
as the effect of aid is expected to occur with a lag. This also reduces problems of reverse 
causality. The volatility of aid (as per cent of GNI) was calculated as the coefficient of 
variation for total aid between 1980 and 2002.11 There is some evidence that the 
volatility of aid differs by type of aid (project or programme) but no disaggregated aid 
volatility data were available (Fielding and Mavrotas 2005).  
Several variables intended to measure the quality of institutions are included in the 
analysis: 
—  Federalism at the state/province level:12 Decentralization is one approach to a 
better match of service delivery with the preferences of the people. However, 
there are many obstacles to decentralization especially in the developing 
countries because the tax base in rural areas is weak and vertical imbalances in 
technical and administrative capacities are large. It is expected that the 
decentralization variable can be of diverging importance for different services 
because the level of expertise needed varies (Bardhan 2002).  
—  Freedom of the press:13 There is some evidence that asymmetric information 
plays an important role in public service delivery, as is shown in the Uganda 
                                                 
9   If not stated otherwise, data are for 2002 from the World Bank World Development Indicators 
database (World Bank 2005). Data that more directly measure the quality of provision of water and 
sanitation like continuity of service or quality of water are not available for a large enough number of 
countries or refer only to groups of users such as urban areas or commercial users (see Estache and 
Goicoechea 2005). 
10  As the biggest part of these expenditures is current expenditure for salaries, etc., data for the same 
year as the dependent variables (2002) are used. 
11 ODA data are taken from OECD-DAC statistics (OECD 2006). 
12 The variable used for decentralization is from the updated World Bank Database of Political 
Institutions (Beck et al. 2001). The indicator used is: Are the state/province governments locally 
elected?, taking the value 0 for no decentralization, 1 for some decentralization and 2 for 
decentralization. 
13    The scores of freedom of the press produced by Freedom House (2005) are widely used by 
governments, international organizations, academics, and the news media in many countries. 
Countries are given a total score from 0 (worst) to 100 (best) on the basis of a set of 23 methodology 
questions divided into three subcategories. This is a modification to simplify the interpretation of 
results: new score = 100 – original score from Freedom House. Assigning numerical points allows for 
comparative analysis among the countries surveyed and facilitates an examination of trends over time. 9 
example discussed above. Therefore countries with better media coverage 
should have more efficient public service provision. The freedom-of-press 
variable is highly correlated with voice and accountability, which measures 
various aspects of the political process, civil liberties, political and human 
rights.14 It therefore captures the extent to which citizens of a country are able 
to participate in the selection of government. It is assumed that greater 
participation will lead to a better targeting of public services and thus to better 
outcomes.  
—  Control over corruption:15 Corruption can affect the provision of public 
services through three channels, namely increase of prices and decrease of 
government output, reduced investment in human capital and thus shortage of 
inputs and reduction of government revenue. Corruption reduces spending on 
operations and maintenance. Previous research thus found a negative 
relationship between corruption and the provision of health care and education 
(Gupta, Davoodi and Tiongson 2000). The main characteristics that make the 
health sector vulnerable to corruption are the imbalance of information (e.g., 
between professionals and patients), uncertainty in health markets and 
complexity of the health systems (Transparency International 2006). 
The socioeconomic control variables that are standard in the public service delivery 
literature include the following (Gupta, Verhoeven and Tiongson 1999; Rajkumar and 
Swaroop 2002): 
—  Fertility: If fertility is high, this implies a higher share of children in the 
population and thus higher costs for schooling. It also increases the health care 
costs for pregnant women and children. Thus it is expected that the coefficient 
is negative for both health and education outcomes. 
—  Adult literacy rates: Educated parents are more likely to be willing and able to 
send their children to school. Therefore a positive relationship is expected for 
education. 
—  Population density:  Population density is expected to reduce the costs of 
service provision on a per capita basis. In addition, the costs to use the 
facilities in terms of transport costs and opportunity costs such as travel time 
are lower. Hence, population density should also be positively associated with 
all outcome indicators. 
—  Prevalence of HIV: The spread of HIV/AIDS,16 which is most dramatic in 
Africa, puts a strain on the availability of qualified personnel especially in 
                                                 
14  These data are from the World Bank project: Governance Matters (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 
2005). The indicator is based on perceptions and ranges from -2.32 to 1.72 for 2002, with higher 
values representing higher accountability. The correlation coefficient between press freedom and 
voice and accountability is -0.94. 
15  The corruption indicator is also taken from the World Bank project: Governance Matters (Kaufmann, 
Kraay and Mastruzzi 2005). The indicator is based on perceptions and ranges from -1.86 to 2.45 for 
2002, with higher values representing higher control and thus less corruption. 
16  This is measured as infected people as a share of the population aged 15-49. 10 
education and health. In addition, it is expected to have a direct, negative 
impact on infant and child health. 
—  Africa dummy: As we are specifically interested in public service delivery in 
Africa where most of the MDGs are unlikely to be met, an Africa dummy is 
included. It is expected that it will have a negative coefficient. 
—  Interaction terms: The discussion above indicates that aid can have a positive 
outcome only if good institutions are in place. For example if corruption is 
high, it is likely that only a fraction of the sector aid will actually be spent for 
service delivery, while the remainder disappears (Rajkumar and Swaroop 
2002). Therefore the different aid variables interact with press freedom and 
control of corruption.  
A few variables commonly used in similar studies—like urbanization—were initially 
included in the analysis, but as they were not significant for any of the regressions, they 
were dropped. GDP per capita could not be included as it is highly correlated with other 
relevant variables such as health expenditure per capita and control of corruption. The 
correlation coefficient between the independent variables included in the regressions is 
less than 0.75. Thus multicollinearity among variables could affect the standard errors 
of coefficients to some extent. There are other potential determinants of public service 
outcomes that could not be included in the analysis due to a lack of data.17 For example, 
child mortality is also influenced by other factors such as malnutrition. Only developing 
countries were included for the empirical analysis.18  
5 Results 
5.1  Water and sanitation 
Table 2 reports the results of four OLS regressions for access to water and sanitation. 
The share of ODA that is allocated for water and sanitation does not have a significant 
coefficient in the different specifications. The exception is specification II-B where the 
coefficient is negative, implying that aid to water seems not to be effective. However, 
this result might be partly driven by the absence of available data on government and 
private sector spending in the sector. Likewise total aid as a percentage of GNI has a 
significant negative coefficient in specification II-A. Thus the impact of aid on the 
effectiveness of service delivery in these areas is limited, at best. This might also be 
attributed to the management problems and the increased costs associated with aid 
discussed above. 
Surprisingly, the coefficient of aid volatility is positive and significant in three of the 
specifications. This result could be driven by the fact that water and sanitation 
expenditure is easier to adapt to changes in aid flows than expenditure in personnel 
intensive sectors, where expansion of services is associated with training. However, it 
                                                 
17  This might cause some problems of omitted variables. 
18  See table of outcome indicators, ODA per sector and governance indicators for all countries, which is 
provided at the RWE homepage at  www.uni-kiel.de/ifw/pub/wa/wa.htm. 11 
could also be the case that the implementation of water and sanitation projects—which 
are often big and are carried out over a limited period—increases the volatility of aid 
disbursements.  
The effect of governance on access to water and sanitation is also limited. As expected, 
press freedom has a positive coefficient, although it is significant only for access to 
water. This might again be due to the fact that the indicator is not specific for water and 
sanitation. Thus a positive association between access to information or voice and 
accountability and access to water and sanitation might exist, driven by improved 
accountability. The coefficient for control over corruption is not significant, but the 
interaction term between corruption and aid to water and sanitation has a positive 
significant coefficient for water (specification II-B), meaning that control of corruption 
does not have a direct effect on access to water, but that the efficacy of aid in improving 
access to water is positively related with control of corruption. This finding to some 
extent confirms the hypothesis that higher control of corruption can increase the 
effectiveness of aid. 
Table 2 
Regression results for access to water and sanitation (% of population) 
 Ln  sanitation    Ln  water 
 I-A  I-B    II-A  II-B 
        






























































































        
No. of observations  109  71    110  72 
Adjusted R-squared  0.5477 0.5604    0.5154 0.5483 
F-statistic 11.29***  6.73***   13.16***  6.47*** 
Note:    For all regressions white’s heteroscedasticity-corrected t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. 
*** indicate significance at the 1 per cent level, ** significance at the 5 per cent level and 
* significance at the 10 per cent level. 
Source:   Author’s calculations. 12 
The level of federalism at the provincial level is included only in two specifications (I-B 
and II-B) as it reduces the number of observations considerably. It has a negative 
association with access to water and sanitation, which is significant only in the case of 
water. This implies that decentralization is not a panacea for pro-poor development and 
public service provision, especially as its implementation is often sketchy, as discussed 
above. If economies of scale and network externalities exist—as in the case of 
infrastructure—central planning might lead to better outcomes. 
The fertility rate is negatively associated with both access to sanitation and water, as 
expected. In addition, population density has a positive association with water and 
sanitation, with a significant coefficient in specification II-A, as it is more cost effective 
to provide network infrastructure if population density is high. The coefficient for the 
African dummy is negative for sanitation and positive for water, but never significant. 
This indicates that the low performance of African countries can be explained by the 
other independent variables. For the fitted values for water used in the following 
regressions, specification II-A was chosen because the number of observations was 
much higher than in II-B.19 
5.2 Health 
The results for four OLS regressions of health outcomes are reported in Table 3. The per 
capita health expenditure has a negative coefficient, which is significant in two 
specifications, indicating that higher health expenditure reduces infant and child 
mortality in line with the reviewed literature (Gupta, Verhoeven and Tiongson 1999; 
Rajkumar and Swaroop 2002; World Bank/IMF 2005). Likewise the share of ODA for 
health has a significant negative coefficient for child mortality, which indicates that aid 
in this area seems to be effective. However, the coefficient for the share of ODA in GNI 
is positive and significant in all cases, meaning aid could worsen health outcomes as in 
the case of water and sanitation because of its macro effects. The coefficient for the 
volatility of aid is significant and negative in specifications III-B, IV-A and IV-B, 
implying that higher volatility reduces child mortality. This result is similar to that for 
water and sanitation and might also be explained by the use of volatility of total aid. In 
addition, aid for health has been increasing in line with the focus on reaching the 
MDGs, so volatility could be associated with an increase in funding. 
Access to water has a positive and significant coefficient in three of the four 
specifications, contradicting the hypothesis that access to water should lower infant and 
child mortality. This is despite the fact that the correlation between the fitted values for 
access to water and health outcomes has a significant coefficient of -0.78 for ln infant 
mortality and -0.80 for ln child mortality. One explanation for this result could be that 
both sectors compete for funds. Rajkumar and Swaroop (2002) also find positive 
coefficients for access to safe water in some of their regressions with a similar 
specification, but these coefficients are not significant. 
 
                                                 
19 The relatively low R-squared in Table 2 are probably due to the lack of data on public spending on 
water and sanitation. 13 
Table 3 
Regression results for health indicators 
  Ln infant mortality    Ln under 5 mortality 
  III-A III-B    IV-A IV-B 
         
































































































         
Number of observations  63  50    62  50 
Adjusted R-squared  0.7926 0.8297    0.8088  0.8482 
F-statistic 34.54***  35.01***   31.28*** 23.16*** 
Note:    For all regressions White’s heteroscedasticity-corrected t-statistics are shown in parenthesis.   
*** indicates significance at the 1 per cent level, ** significance at the 5 per cent level and 
* significance at the 10 per cent level. Independent variables related to education were also 
included in the regression, due to the structure of the system of equations, but are not reported 
here. 
Source:   Author’s calculations. 
The control-over-corruption index does have a negative coefficient, which is significant 
in specification III-A, meaning that greater control of corruption could reduce infant 
mortality. However, interacted with the share of ODA for health the coefficients are not 
significant, meaning that beyond the direct effect control of corruption seems not to 
increase the efficacy of aid.20 
The federalism index is again only included in two specifications and has a significant 
positive coefficient for child mortality. This result might be due to the fact that the 
capacity and resources at the provincial and local level to provide adequate services is 
insufficient as discussed above. 
                                                 
20 The press freedom variables as well as the African dummy were dropped from the regressions as they 
were not significant and as the number of observations was reduced for the regressions on health and 
education. 14 
Higher fertility is positively associated with infant and child mortality, as it increases 
the cost of service delivery, which is in line with the results by Rajkumar and Swaroop 
(2002). Population density has a negative coefficient, which is however not significant 
in any of the specifications. The prevalence of HIV increases infant and child mortality 
as expected.  
5.3 Education   
The results of the four OLS regressions for education are reported in Table 4. The 
coefficient for public expenditure per student is always negative but significant only in 
specification V-A, indicating that expenditure per student does not increase education 
outcomes. This is in line with previous results, for example, by Rajkumar and Swaroop 
(2002). 
Table 4 
Regression results for education indicators 
  Ln primary completion rate Ln youth literacy 
 V-A  V-B  VI-A  VI-B 
          












































































































          
No. of observations  52  41  52  41 
Adjusted R-squared  0.8362 0.8242 0.8779  0.8973 
F-statistic 11.87***  15.04*** 9.24***  12.49*** 
Note:  For all regressions White’s heteroscedasticity-corrected t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. 
*** indicates significance at the 1 per cent level, ** significance at the 5 per cent level, and 
* significance at the 10 per cent level. 
Source: Author’s  calculations. 15 
In contrast, the share of ODA for primary education is positive and significant for two 
specifications implying that aid for education has a positive impact on both primary 
completion rate and youth literacy. The coefficient for aid as a share of GNI is negative 
and significant in three cases, similar to the results for water and sanitation and health. 
The coefficient for the volatility of aid is negative and significant for primary 
completion rate (V-A), meaning that higher aid volatility might reduce the efficiency of 
education, as discussed above. However the coefficient for aid volatility is positive and 
significant for youth literacy (VI-A), which might be explained by similar factors as in 
the case of health.  
Contrary to expectations, access to water has a significant negative association with 
education outcomes similar to the findings for health. Infant mortality has a negative 
coefficient, which is significant only in specification VI-A for youth literacy, indicating 
that better health also improves education outcomes, as expected.  
Governance seems to be more important for education than for health. Controlling for 
corruption seems to improve education outcomes with significant coefficients for two 
specifications. However, as in the case of health, the interaction term between control 
over corruption and share of ODA is not significant. Thus controlling for corruption 
seems to have a direct effect on education. 
Federalism at the provincial level does not seem to have any effect on education 
outcomes, probably because positive effects of the decisionmaking being closer to the 
recipients and negative effects of local-level capacity and financial problems offset each 
other. The coefficients of the other control variables are as expected, with a negative 
significant association for fertility and a positive significant association for adult 
literacy. 
6 Conclusions 
Overall, the share of ODA provided for education and health seems to have a positive 
impact on outcomes in these sectors. However, total aid seems to be negatively 
associated with outcomes in these sectors, whereas aid volatility is associated with 
better outcomes in sanitation, water and infant mortality. It seems that the negative 
effect of aid volatility with respect to public service outcomes is either more difficult to 
capture or less damaging than expected. Future research also using private expenditure 
on education, health and water and sector specific volatility of aid and other expenditure 
once the data become available will be useful to clarify some of the unexpected results. 
The results presented above could imply that although aid targeted to specific sectors 
and targets might have positive effects, a general increase in aid could create additional 
problems with respect to Dutch disease, less accountability of governments towards 
local populations, and more opportunities for corruption. Overall, aid cannot be the only 
solution for improved service delivery to meet the MDGs because of its mixed impact. 
With respect to institutions and governance, the results are also mixed. Press freedom, 
which is highly correlated with voice and accountability, seems to have a positive 
association with access to water. Control of corruption is positively associated with 
outcomes in health and education. Thus an improvement in these areas is likely to 16 
reduce the financing needed for reaching the MDGs. Decentralization is negatively 
associated with access to water and reduction of child mortality. This might indicate that 
there is a considerable lack of capacity at the local level, which needs to be addressed 
first before the potential positive effects of decentralization like better targeting and 
accountability can materialize. 
The results of this paper make it clear that although some similarities exist between the 
different sectors, there are also important differences with respect to the effects of better 
governance and decentralization. In particular, decentralization cannot be regarded as a 
fast track to circumvent unresponsive central governments. Rather, capacity has to be 
built at the local level together with creating local revenue and delegating 
decisionmaking. A relatively high share of aid relative to total government spending 
also means that these processes are often influenced by donors, and that influence might 
reduce flexibility. Further research about how different aid modalities and different 
institutional settings influence public service outcomes at the country level is therefore 
needed. 
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Annex 
Annex Table 
Selected indicators on infrastructure, health, education, aid, corruption and press freedom, 2002 

















































































































































































                 
Albania 89  97          20.18 4.75  8.27  -0.83 48 
Algeria 92  87  36  43  90  96  0.08 0.93  46.75  -0.72 62 
Angola 30  50            2.66 11.74  5.95  -1.17 79 
Antigua & Barbuda  95  91           0.00 0.00  4.74  0.84 44 
Argentina        17  20  99  103  0.08 1.45  18.16  -0.78 37 
Armenia 84  92  32  35  99  103  1.10 3.68  2.76  -0.69 60 
Azerbaijan 55  77  76        8.30 3.60  1.43  -1.04 77 
Bahrain        12  15  99  100 0.00 7.05  59.03  0.96 75 
Bangladesh 48  75          5.32 9.70  4.32  -0.95 63 
Barbados 99  100  11  13  100  110  0.00 0.00  2.59  1.29 16 
Belize 47  91  33  40  90  89  0.00 8.68  7.63  -0.24 24 
Benin 32  68  93  158  56  51  6.99 5.02  7.51  -0.52 30 
Bolivia 45  85  56  70  96  102  5.61 4.51  3.20  -0.82 72 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 93  98            1.95 1.23  3.49  -0.61 53 
Botswana 41  95  78  107  89  91  0.00 0.96  3.82  0.80 30 
Brazil 75  89  34  37  95  112  1.06 0.68  17.45  -0.06 32 
Burkina Faso  12  51          7.50 1.82  3.73  0.13 39 
Burundi 36  79  114  190  66  31  0.33 1.86  1.27  -0.98 77 
Cambodia 16  34  96  137  80  69  0.15 4.36  2.91  -0.95 68 
Cameroon 48  63          1.11 8.26  15.22  -1.04 68 
Cape Verde  42  80          0.71 1.44  12.86  0.46 30 
Chad 8  34          7.11 16.33  1.87  -0.94 74 
China 44  77          23.32 1.51  3.18  -0.35 80 
Colombia 86  92  19  22  97  88  0.01 0.64  1.23  -0.51 60 
Comoros 23  94          0.00 4.47  21.18  -0.92 41 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  29  46           0.74 12.93  7.41  -1.42 86 
Congo, Rep.  9  46  81  108  98  47 0.76 2.97  24.77  -1.02 53 
Costa Rica  92  97  9  11  98  94 1.21 6.41  4.44  0.91 17 
Côte d’Ivoire  40  84  116  190      0.16 0.75  7.15  -0.92 66 
Croatia        6  7  99  94 0.24 0.76  14.39  0.25 33 
Djibouti 50  80          1.67 4.01  30.21  -0.72 67 
Dominica 83  97          0.00 0.00  1.39  0.54 16 
Dominican Republic  57  93  31  37  92  94  9.93 1.22  8.26  -0.40 30 
Ecuador 72  86  25  29  97  100  21.11 1.64  3.04  -1.00 40 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  68  98          2.76 2.33  5.45  -0.28 77 
El Salvador  63  82  33  38  89  86  1.77 9.12  6.88  -0.49 35 
Equatorial Guinea  53  44          0.33 17.95  33.52  -1.86 80 
Eritrea 9  57  49  90      0.10 16.03 11.75  -0.09 79 
Ethiopia 6  22          0.66 1.85  4.78  -0.32 61 
Gabon 36  87  90  91      0.00 2.19  22.89  -0.52 52 
Gambia, The  53  82  91  125      0.48 2.33  25.91  -0.74 65 
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Annex Table (con’t) 
Selected indicators on infrastructure, health,  
education, aid, corruption and press freedom, 2002 
















































































































































































                   
Georgia 83  76          0.19 1.77 3.57 -1.03  53 
Ghana 58  79          5.36 4.74 2.43 -0.39  27 
Guinea 13  51  108  167      5.70 13.46 19.06  -0.66  74 
Guinea-Bissau 34  59      0.37 1.46 5.70  -0.59  56 
Guyana  70  83 53 71      19.68 0.19 1.60  -0.48 23 
Honduras 68  90          9.97 0.56 1.29 -0.76  43 
India 30  86  65  90  72 81  5.80 23.02 16.17 -0.36  42 
Indonesia 52  78  33  44  98 95  0.66 9.96 5.26 -1.15  53 
Iran, Islamic Rep.  84  93  34  41 94 106  0.00 0.49 32.04  -0.36 75 
Jamaica  80  93 17 20 94 89  10.72 1.62 15.23  -0.45 17 
Jordan 93  91          22.01 3.36 2.43  0.04  60 
Kazakhstan 72  86  63  73  100 102 1.86 0.94 2.33  -1.06  69 
Kenya 48  62          1.42 9.54 3.58  -1.09  67 
Kiribati 39  64            0.00 0.49 36.52  0.20  21 
Kyrgyz  Republic  60  76 59 69      0.10 0.85 1.06  -0.83 68 
Lao  PDR  24  43 86 98 79 73  11.96 12.68 12.08  -0.97 82 
Lebanon  98  100 27 31      1.70 4.23 26.49  -0.37 74 
Lesotho 37  76  78  107  90 67  6.13 15.99 8.53 -0.18  46 
Liberia 26  62          0.16 22.23 5.38  -1.30  77 
Madagascar  33  45 81  130      2.21 1.98 5.37 0.05 31 
Malawi 46  67          1.40 4.91 22.75  -0.85  54 
Malaysia     95  7  8  97 92  39.92 0.00 0.45  0.36  71 
Maldives 58  84            0.00 0.49 59.67  -0.05  61 
Mali 45  48  123  222  30 39  1.35 3.94 13.79  -0.11  23 
Mauritania 42  56         0.62 1.57 5.82  0.20  61 
Mauritius 99  100         19.25 1.48 42.12  0.49  17 
Moldova  68  92 26 32  100 83  0.23 27.14 2.09  -0.90 59 
Mongolia 59  62  58  71  98 108 0.08 5.40 7.24  0.11  31 
Morocco  61  80 39 42 70 68  27.31 8.12 20.73  -0.05 58 
Mozambique 27  42          2.71 7.59 4.46  -0.84  48 
Namibia 30  80  49  67  92 90  1.64 1.50 23.78  0.16  34 
Nepal  27  84 65 89 63 78  14.58 4.69 5.64  -0.37 60 
Nicaragua 66  81  32  40  80 75  11.96 5.00 8.83 -0.46  32 
Niger 12  46  157  266  24 21  4.69 1.54 3.17 -1.06  49 
Nigeria 38  60          5.54 9.32 12.33  -1.32  57 
Oman  89  79 11 13 99 73  0.24 3.05 4.57 1.00 68 
Pakistan 54  90            0.28 6.21 2.60  -0.81  57 
Panama  72  91 19 25 97 98  3.89 5.67 12.44  -0.24 30 
Papua New 
Guinea  45  39 69 94      1.40 19.38 18.18  -0.75 26 
Paraguay  78  83 25 30 97 93  0.33 0.64 6.72  -1.20 51 
Peru  62  81 29 38 97 98  41.51 2.35 2.21  -0.23 30 
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Selected indicators on infrastructure, health,  
education, aid, corruption and press freedom, 2002 
















































































































































































                    
Philippines  73  85 28 38 95  98 1.25 3.52  1.67  -0.50  30 
Rwanda 41  73  118  203  85  37  1.38 3.65  10.32  -0.34  87 
Sao Tome & Principe  24  79         7.12 8.68  8.17  -0.31  19 
Senegal 52  72  19  138  53  48  1.20 1.65 14.75 -0.19  39 
Sierra  Leone  39  57       0.97 9.83  0.48  -0.79  62 
Solomon  Islands 31  70         1.48 16.08  6.11  -1.58  24 
South Africa  67  87  52  65  92 99 1.40 3.58  16.90  0.35 23 
Sri  Lanka  91  78         7.46 8.55  17.46  -0.13  63 
St Kitts and Nevis  96  99          0.00 0.00  0.16  0.41  18 
St  Lucia  89  98      1.45 0.00  0.81  0.41 11 
Sudan  34  69       0.96 4.34  3.58  -1.03  87 
Suriname  93  92         0.71 19.06  3.75  0.19  25 
Swaziland 52  52  101  146  91  75  0.21 0.81  1.88  -0.30  77 
Syrian Arab Republic 77  79  17  20  95  88  17.67 0.62  31.92  -0.28  78 
Tajikistan  53  58 78 97 99  100 0.05 7.99 2.96  -1.07  80 
Tanzania  46  73       1.89 3.91  2.33  -0.97  49 
Thailand  99  85 24 27 98  86 9.17 0.11  0.99  -0.28  30 
Timor-Leste  33  52         0.79 0.63  3.06  -0.52  21 
Togo 34  51  79  141  77  78  0.40 14.63  11.70  -0.68  68 
Tonga  97  100       57.35 0.47  4.18  -0.73  36 
Tunisia  80  82 20 26 94  99  13.48 0.27  20.57  0.44  73 
Turkey  83  93       9.99 0.05  30.71  -0.40  58 
Turkmenistan  62  71        0.12 5.50  5.24  -1.21  91 
Uganda  41  56       2.55 10.77  8.14  -0.92  42 
Uruguay  94  98 13 15 99  95 0.00 0.33 22.82  0.81  25 
Uzbekistan  57  89       1.86 15.62 9.08  -1.03  84 
Vanuatu  50  60       0.00 7.96 19.56 -0.83  24 
Venezuela,  RB  68  83      1.13 0.42  14.91  -0.94 44 
Vietnam  41  73       5.75 1.59 5.52  -0.67  82 
Zambia 45  55  102  182  89  60  6.15 2.88  1.03  -0.91  65 
Zimbabwe  57  83 75 12 98  81 1.11 14.67 6.52  -1.22  83 
Note:   The countries for which the respective dependent variable is reported here were included in the 
regression analysis in this paper. 
Source:  World Bank (2005); OECD (2006); Freedom House (2005). 
  
 
 